

[Words excised] the Berlin leadership - governing Mayor Brandt and others - favored the overall approach of the US in its talks with the Soviets on Berlin. They were more interested in the details than in the general approach, however. Mr. Kohler said we regarded Brandt, and the Berliners generally, as key people in the situation and that we had never been quite certain they felt that they were being kept fully informed by the Federal Republic. He noted Brandt's statement on intra-Berlin arrangements which appeared to indicate that he was unaware this had been included in one of the papers prepared for talks with the Soviets. [Words excised] had received information about the papers

[line excised]

[word excised] but did not recall a paragraph on this subject. [words excised]

[word excised] they were particularly interested in this matter. Mr. Kohler said the US was also, but warned against having illusions as to the likelihood of anything significant being agreed on. [excised] asked for his estimate of the Soviet reaction and Mr. Kohler replied that since the revised form of the paper, containing the paragraph, had not been shown to the Russians he would not want to commit himself on that point. He pointed out, however, that the Russians had rejected our earlier all-Berlin proposal. We noted that the reason for our not having shown the paper to the Russians was the leak in Bonn and the resulting situation.

With respect to the leak, [words excised] volunteered that he and Brandt had seen Ambassador Grewe's April 9 report on the two papers for the first time on April 11, after they had lunched with journalists, and thus obviously could not have been responsible. He now asked if we considered US-German relations strained as a result of the leak. Mr. Kohler said we were inclined to regard

EXCISE

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Memorandum of Conversations

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Mr. Kohler's Office
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APRIL 1984 VOL 60 NO 4

MR - Roy D. Kohler
MR - Arthur R. Dorn

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the Berlin leadership - governing Mayor Brandt and others - favored the overall approach of the US in its talks with the Soviets on Berlin. They were more interested in the details than in the general approach, however. Mr. Kohler said we regarded Brandt, and the Berliners generally, as key people in the situation and that we had never been quite certain they felt that they were being kept fully informed by the Federal Republic. He noted Brandt's statement on intra-Berlin arrangements which appeared to indicate that he was unaware this had been included in one of the papers prepared for talks with the Soviets. [] had received information about the papers

they were particularly interested in this matter. Mr. Walker said the US was also, but opposed against having illusions as to the likelihood of anything significant being agreed on. And for his estimate of the Soviet reaction and Mr. Walker replied that since the revised text of the paper, containing the paragraph, had not been shown to the Russians, he would not want to comment on it. On that point, Mr. Johnson said, however, that the Russians had rejected our earlier anti-Moratorium proposal. He added that the reason for our not having shown the paper to the Russians was that it was the US and the Soviet reaction.

...which caused the book to be withdrawn. It is believed that he and Soviet had been discussing the book's April 19 report on the two papers for the first time on April 11, 1948. They had discussed with journalists, and these obviously caused the book to be re-examined. The new edition of an otherwise US-Soviet Millions strength is a result of the book, and neither side nor were inclined to regard

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TRANSCRIPTION - POLITICAL TALKING

the incident as a problem of internal German politics and
not of US-German relations. [Words excised]

[Excised] then asked if we expected to reach an
agreement with the Soviets on Berlin. Mr. Kohler replied we
were quite sure the Russians were impressed by our military
build-up, and it seemed clear they recognized their course
was a dangerous one. They seemed to want to continue
talking. However, there had so far been not the slightest
agreement on essentials. They were of course probing us
too, and it was quite conceivable that if we continued to
refuse to give anything of substance they would let the
issue rest for awhile. Alternatively, they might accept
some face-saving formula. There were a few encouraging
signs that we might be able to agree on maintaining the
status quo.
(paragraph excised)

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the incident as a problem of internal German politics and not of US-German relations.

then asked if we expected to reach an agreement with the Soviets on Berlin. Mr. Nehler replied we were quite sure the Russians were impressed by our military buildup, and it seemed since they recognized that we now had a dangerous one. They seemed to want to continue talking. However, there had so far been no slight agreement on essentials. They were of course pushing us too, and it was quite conceivable that if we continued to refuse to give anything of substance they would let the issue rest for awhile. Alternatively, they might accept some face-saving formula. There were a few encouraging signs that we might be able to agree on maintaining the status quo.

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